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Abstract 
We contrast conventional strategic approaches derived from neoclassical economics with a 
socio-ecological approach to strategy. We propose that the socio-ecological approach, and 
specifically the causal textures theory of organizational environments it spawned, helps strategic 
planners to better engage unpredictable uncertainty that characterizes turbulent environments. To 
support our argument, we render explicit three principles that have been implicit in causal 
textures theory. We articulate general strategic planning stances for organizations consistent with 
each of the three principles, and demonstrate how scenario planning can help to instantiate each 
principle. We conclude that causal textures theory helps strategic planners to better understand 
the purpose of scenario planning and helps to guide them on how to make use of scenario 
planning to effect better strategies in a turbulent environment.  
 
Keywords: Environment uncertainty; High velocity environment; Inter-organizational 
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Introduction  
Research on uncertainty located in the context or environment in which organizations are 
situated has a long and rich intellectual history, not only in the strategic planning field, but also 
in the decision-making and organization-design literatures. Within organization studies it goes 
back at least to Emery and Trist’s (1965) "causal texture of organizational environments" and 
Thompson’s Organizations in Action (1967). But there is no consensus on what uncertainty is, 
nor on what it means for strategic planners. Without intending to oversimplify the concept, 
uncertainty as studied in the field of strategic planning has been considered from two different 
perspectives: the dominant neoclassical approach and the less well-known socio-ecological one, 
both of which we discuss below.  
This paper uses the socio-ecological approach to highlight aspects of uncertainty that the 
conventional neoclassical approach has downplayed or neglected. In so doing, the paper 
proposes that when organizations face turbulent contextual conditions (Emery and Trist, 1965; 
McCann and Selsky, 1984; Ramírez et al., 2008, 2010), it is advisable for them to reorient how 
they consider uncertainty in their strategic planning (Knight, 1921; Emery, 1977; Ramírez and 
Ravetz, 2011). Specifically, the paper proposes that the difference between neoclassical and 
socio-ecological approaches extends to how they consider scenario planning, and that a socio-
ecological approach toward scenario planning can help them achieve this reorientation, and 
thereby improve their strategic planning. Scenario planning has been used to engage uncertain 
contexts since the 1940s in policy and military arenas, and since the 1960s in corporate strategy 
(Kahn, 1962; Berger, 1964; Wack, 1985; Schwartz, 1991; van der Heijden, 1996; Lessourne and 
Stoffaes, 2001; Wright et al., 2013).  
The central purpose of this paper is to substantiate the value of using a socio-ecological 
approach to strategy in turbulent environments. Social ecology has to date elaborated only 
weakly on the strategic implications of its concepts. We help to redress this weakness in this 
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paper. As a complement to this central purpose, we intend to demonstrate why and how scenario 
planning can be used for strategic planning in turbulent environments. 
Organizational scholars using social ecology concepts have been dealing with turbulence 
on a conceptual and a practical basis for nearly fifty years. They have learned that turbulence is 
neither as monolithic nor as fatal as it appeared in Emery and Trist’s original 1965 article. In this 
paper, we gather this learning and codify it into three "principles" about the turbulent causal 
texture of organizational environments which have lain latent in that approach up to now. We 
then draw out strategic planning implications for each one, which, our analysis suggests, enriches 
strategic thinking. We close by suggesting that these principles are articulated through how 
social ecology understands scenario planning. 
Despite considerable research, the role of scenario planning, and how effective it is in 
strategic planning remains contested (see Postma and Liebel, 2005). In this paper we build on 
prior research seeking to relate scenario planning with social ecology concepts (van der Heijden, 
2005; Ramírez et al., 2008) by showing how scenario methods add to the repertoire of strategy 
tools suited to a turbulent environment.  
Our analysis thus offers a twofold contribution: First, we shed light on aspects of 
uncertainty which conventional (i.e., neoclassically based) strategic planning approaches tend to 
downplay, but which are important in turbulent environments. Second, we provide a 
conceptually robust basis for why and how scenario planning can help strategic planners to 
address those neglected aspects advantageously in their strategic planning. Ultimately, our 
demonstration of how scenario planning practices can enrich strategic planning advances both 
organizational theorizing about the environment and strategy scholars’ search for effective 
models in turbulent contexts.  
This paper is organized as follows. First, we overview the main features of the dominant 
neoclassical approach to strategic planning, and contrast these with the features of the socio-
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ecological approach. We then overview causal textures theory (CTT)—the part of the social 
ecology school we concentrate on. We describe how CTT deals with unpredictable uncertainty 
and how it situates “turbulence” as a distinct type of organizational environment. We then 
advance CTT’s notion of the “turbulent causal texture” by identifying and explicating three 
principles that have so far remained implicit in CTT. We suggest that strategic planning 
initiatives to engage turbulent environments can be informed by each of these principles; then, 
we show how scenario planning as understood in the socio-ecological approach can aid such 
initiatives. We close by demonstrating that the CTT-scenario planning relationship is symbiotic, 
both theoretically and in practice; that is, CTT is enriched by what scenario planning
 
brings to it, 
and scenario planning is given a solid foundation by CTT.  
 
Contrasting Two Approaches in Strategic Planning 
For our purposes, strategic planning is a process that supports the creation of future value 
through the identification, definition, production, assessment and application of goals and 
resources, and by selecting or making one or more chosen market spaces (Normann and 
Ramírez, 1993). The focus of this paper is strategic planning at the level of the organization as a 
whole, and/or strategic business units which deliver such value creation. While in some 
organizations this activity is relegated to specialist staff units, such as business development or 
corporate planning departments, in other organizations senior managers engage in, or contribute 
to or decide on formulating and executing strategy. Textbooks often distinguish among corporate 
level (e.g., portfolio management, diversification), business level (e.g., competitive), and 
functional level (e.g., operational, human resources, choices) strategic planning. The corporate 
and business levels are the primary locus of concern in this paper. 
The conventional view of strategic planning, with intellectual roots in neoclassical 
economics, focuses on working with "predictable" uncertainty, which includes supply, demand 
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and internal process fluctuations (sometimes cyclical) largely resulting from competitive 
dynamics. Also included are macroeconomic and, increasingly, ecological factors that can be 
reasonably anticipated. In contrast, a socio-ecological view of strategic planning, with 
intellectual roots in systems theory and field theory, engages not only with predictable 
uncertainty but also with Knight’s (1921) "unpredictable" uncertainty, including environmental 
jolts (Meyer, 1982), unforeseen macro-level disruptions and "black swan" events (Taleb, 2007). 
Below, we outline the contours of these two approaches, a contrast first proposed by Selsky et al. 
(2007). 
In a somewhat simplified, perhaps even caricatured form, conventional neoclassically 
based strategic planning construes uncertainty as commercial challenges to be surmounted 
through competitive moves, along one or more of four choice vectors—cost-quality, timing and 
know-how, entry barriers, and financial resources (D’Aveni and Gunther, 1994). This form of 
strategic planning assumes perfect rationality and equal access to information among the 
competitors. The arena of competition is viewed as the industry (ibid.)
1
, which receives the bulk 
of the planner’s attention, and profit maximization is seen as the goal of each competitor firm 
engaged in its autonomous strategic pursuits. A more nuanced rendering relaxes the assumptions 
of perfect rationality and equal information access by acknowledging the constraints of path 
dependence, as well as the exercise of power and knowledge asymmetries, heterogeneous 
dynamic capabilities, bounded rationality, behavioral biases, and the possibility of game-
changing or "disruptive" innovation moves.  
Selsky et al. (2007) argued that even these nuanced forms are no more than extensions of 
the neoclassical-economics foundation of conventional strategic planning. The problem they saw 
was that “the neoclassical origins of the strategy discipline … are insufficiently responsive to the 
new landscape of strategy that now characterizes many industries” (p. 72). They viewed the popular 
                                                          
1 Sometimes suppliers, customers, potential entrants and substitutes are also included (Ryall, 2008). 
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positioning and strategic maneuvering schools as well as the resource-based view one (Mintzberg et 
al., 2002) as neoclassical approaches, because all emphasize competitive activity among a group 
of peers (usually firms in the same industry), and to be played as a zero sum game (Denning, 
2012). Moreover, efforts toward strategic renewal and the development of dynamic capabilities 
tend to be directed toward each focal firm’s profit-maximization and market share goals. Yet in a 
number of sectors today, strategy comes from players across a range of industries, in which they 
both collaborate and compete. For example, Sempels and Hoffman (2013) describe how in the 
“city services business” companies like Cisco, Siemens, IBM, Veolia, Bolloré, Peugeot and 
JCDecaux compete for a bigger share of city budgets.  
Moreover, Selsky et al.  (2007) argued that most mainstream strategic planning 
approaches conflate strategy with competition. The neoclassical approach thus relegates 
cooperative and collaborative initiatives to a tactical position, marginal to the main strategic 
activity. Here alliances and joint ventures tend to be undertaken in order for a focal firm to 
extract value from them for its own goals, at the expense of not only other alliance participants 
but also other players such as customers and suppliers. 
Building on Emery and Trist (1965), Selsky et al. (2007) concluded that greater 
competitive intensity can damage the wider field of action through negative externalities not 
absorbed by the producers. They considered much of the strategic partnering seen across many 
industries to be “opportunistic”, as the benefit accruing to each player tends to destabilize the 
wider field of action. This line of thinking was furthered by Dangerman and Schellnhuber 
(2013), who studied how the fossil fuel economy lock-in benefits individual firms and consumers 
over the short term, but hurts the field as a whole through climate change.  
When the environment which companies inhabit changes, or is considered that it might 
soon change, companies engage in strategic renewal efforts to reinvent themselves, as Nokia has 
done several times (Aspara et al., 2013). When they become able at this, the routines they utilize 
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become dynamic capabilities that can be used repeatedly for their own strategic purposes 
(Ramírez, Gronquist and Osterman, 2013). 
Selsky et al. (2007) argued that the neoclassical approach to strategic planning is 
challenged by environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982; Selsky and McCann, 2008), and by 
discontinuities and bifurcations (Prigogine, 1996; Bernard, 2008; Gladwell, 2000). This is 
because neoclassical approaches rely on competitive patterns (actions and reactions among 
players) observed in past behavior, and which are extrapolated into the future in terms of 
forecasts (Mintzberg, 1994). In addition, the neoclassical view assumes that the broader context 
for strategic action—the macro situation which envelops the "industry"—will remain stable in 
the sense that the fundamental structure of the environment will not change as a result of the 
players’ intensified or sped-up competitive actions. 
The socio-ecological approach to strategic planning is grounded in an open-systems view 
of an organization’s strategic situation. As opposed to the firm as the focal unit of analysis in the 
neoclassical approach, it is the shared field of interorganizational action (Lewin, 1952) that is the 
core unit of analysis. It is within this broader perspective that the socio-ecological approach 
seeks to understand the position and behavior of actors (for our purposes, organizations) in that 
field. For instance, the business ecosystem model offered by Iansiti and Levien (2004), 
comprised of a central "keystone" firm and complementary firms in dynamic interaction over 
time, is a step in the direction of a field-based, socio-ecological approach to strategy; see also 
Normann and Ramírez’s (1993) value constellation2.  
In the socio-ecological approach, collaborative interactions enjoy a higher profile as 
integral components of corporate and business strategic planning than in the neoclassical 
approach. Yet the emphasis is not within the industry, not on horizontal partnering with 
competitors, or even vertical ventures with value-chain partners. Instead, here collaboration is 
                                                          
2 This was earlier explained by Callon (1986) and Akrich et al. (2002) in their sociology of translation, where they studied, for 
example, how EDF tried as a focal actor to create an “actor-network system" for electric cars with Renault. 
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with diverse actors and stakeholders of the broader fields in which organizations operate in order 
to together engage contextual level forces that affect or may affect all actors in a field. Examples 
include case studies of multi-stakeholder collaboration for regional economic development 
(Pava, 1980; Trist, 1986); business network development (Chisholm, 2001); complex cross-
industry innovation (Dougherty and Dunne, 2012); and for cross-sector/multi-sectoral 
partnerships to address thorny social issues, such as climate change and economic inequality (see 
studies in Seitanidi and Crane, 2014). 
In all such studies the field as a whole, rather than the single organization, becomes the 
locus for strategic planning. This opens up new possibilities. As Selsky et al. (2007, 75) 
proposed:  
 
“In strategy making grounded in socio-ecological thinking, a generative dynamic 
of change arises from many sources in a field of action. Decision makers 
understand they can neither predict nor control this dynamic by each firm 
conducting its own conventional strategic decision making. Instead they engage 
in … deliberation and dialogue … in innovating new processes to guide their 
interactions and stabilize the extended field (Normann & Ramírez, 1993)… 
developing knowledge-based networks (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Hanssen-Bauer & 
Snow, 1996)… new adaptive skills and capabilities at the firm and field levels 
(Lampel & Shamsie, 2003), such as learning and unlearning (Bettis & Hitt, 
1995).” 
 
The contrast we have introduced is important because it bears on the strategic relevance 
of predictable versus unpredictable uncertainty. In neo-classically based strategic planning, the 
single firm focus on commercial and competitive challenges, even when these lead to 
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hypercompetitive (d’Aveni and Gunther, 1994; Hanssen-Bauer and Snow, 1996) or game-
changing possibilities (Christensen, 1997), implies a rather predictable kind of uncertainty. 
Decision theorists know that much of this can be assessed as risk. Responses tend to be “more of 
the same” leading to more intense competition as if nothing had changed or could change—
which as Christensen showed, in most cases leads to the firm disappearing.  
Socio-ecologically based strategic planning acknowledges commercial and competitive 
challenges, but is more sensitized to macro level disruptions and unpredictable uncertainty. It 
suggests that, when unpredictable uncertainty becomes the central concern of strategic planners, 
the strategic situation has shifted into a different, turbulent "texture", which calls for a different 
mode of strategic planning (Emery and Trist, 1965; Selsky et al., 2007). In the next section, we 
introduce the notion of causal textures of the environment to appreciate how unpredictable 
uncertainty invites strategic planners to broaden their view of the environment, and refocus 
scenario planning’s role accordingly. 
 
Causal Textures Theory: Theorizing Unpredictable Uncertainty 
Origins and Main Contours. In the 1960s, researchers at London’s Tavistock Institute sought to 
better understand increasing environmental complexity and uncertainty. This was the genesis of 
the social ecology school in organization studies.  
Social ecology drew heavily on both systems theory and on contingency theory, which 
were still being developed. Contingency and population-ecology theorists offered 
conceptualizations of environmental uncertainty which focused on measurable dimensions such 
as the munificence, dynamism and complexity of task environments (Scott, 2002; 
Castrogiovanni, 2002). These became the accepted dimensions of the environment found in most 
organization theory textbooks. Social ecology took a different path. 
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Causal textures theory (CTT) is the part of the social ecology school that studies 
environmental types, and attends to how an organization and its environment relate. Consistent 
with its roots in open systems theory, in CTT parts of an organization and the organization itself 
are interdependent with parts of the organization’s environment. For our purposes, the 
environment is comprised of different elements (forces, factors, actors, interactions).
3
  
From the point of view of a focal actor whose context is being considered, the actors with 
whom it interacts are in its more immediate "transactional" environment. And this focal actor and 
its interactors in its transactional environment are themselves situated in a broader, "contextual 
environment". The contextual environment is made up of forces and factors—again, from the 
point of view of the focal actor—that actor cannot influence. The behavior of the forces and 
factors in the contextual environment, alone and jointly, shape and constrain the interactions and 
roles of actors in this focal actor’s transactional environment (Smith, 1983). Several interacting 
organizations, their shared environments, and the links that join them constitute a "field".  
Emery and Trist’s distinctive contribution to organization studies was to render the 
environment as an explicit construct in and of itself amenable to research. With their 
contribution, the environment was neither "given", "out there", unknowable or random. They 
demonstrated that the environment has a distinct set of "lawful", regularized relations. CTT uses 
the symbol L to denote links within an organization, within the environment and between them. 
It uses the symbol 1 to denote the organization, and the symbol 2 to denote the environment. 
Thus, the two-way links between an organization and its environment involve transactional 
relations: planning (inside-out) L12 relations, and learning (outside-in) L21 relations. Links 
within an organization are L11, those within the environment are L22 (Emery and Trist, 1965; 
M. Emery, 1999). In CTT, an organization and its environment links coevolve over time (Emery 
and Trist, 1973; Trist, 1977; Selsky et al., 2007). Organizations influence their situation in 
                                                          
3
More precisely, social ecology conceptualizes the environment fundamentally as the “extended social field of directive 
correlations” (Emery, 1977). It is a psycho-social space of interacting forces produced by the overlapping, intersecting networks 
of interactions of the purposeful actors inhabiting that space. 
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relation to the environment—and are influenced by the environment—through L12, L21 
relations. As stated above, in the L22 space the contextual environment is beyond the influence 
of any particular organization in the field. The L22 links envelop the transactional L12 and L21 
links for a given organization in a field. It is important to note that the L22 for any particular 
organization is constituted through the nature of L12 and L21 relations of all organizations in a 
shared field. 
In CTT, the L22 distinguishes the transactional and contextual environments from each 
other (Emery and Trist, 1965; van der Heijden, 2005; Ramírez and van der Heijden, 2007). 
Neoclassically based strategic planning is concerned with how the more immediate transactional 
or business environment affects and is affected by the organization. An important implication of 
this for planning is that it tends to relegate the contextual environment to the status of unknown 
and unknowable unknowns or random, chance events. In contrast, the socio-ecological approach 
and CTT are concerned with how the contextual environment may affect and even transform the 
transactional environment. Scenario planning can play an important role here, as we show later 
in this paper. 
An example helps to understand the regularized relations as seen in the CTT conceptual 
framework. Take a London food retail outlet such as a Tesco shop as the L11. Local families’ 
food and shopping preferences, supplier delivery schedules, and parking in the local borough are 
in the retail shop’s L21, L12 transactional environment. The L22 would involve links among 
planning rules, population density, urban mobility, family composition, migration, public health, 
culinary fashions and other forces and factors. Tesco’s planners might consider that L22 links 
may transform what people buy and how, whether they can come by car or not, and when and 
how suppliers work. Tesco management would then consider if these are shop-specific issues, 
London–wide or company-wide, and adjust their formats (# shops/km2, shop size, or % of sales 
online vs. in-shop) accordingly. 
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Emery and Trist proposed four causal textures of the environment, distinguished by the 
salience, complexity and uncertainty of L22 links for the organizations in the field. Table 1 
shows that in each texture one set of links is most salient. Emery and Trist called the most 
complex and challenging environmental texture they were able to conceptualize the Type IV, or 
the "turbulent field", in which the L22 links are of greatest concern.
4
  
 
- Table 1 about here – 
 
As a field moves from one causal texture to the next (Terreberry, 1968), interactions in 
the field become more tightly coupled and thus more complex. The planning (L12) and learning 
(L21) links of organizations in the field that enabled survival in less-turbulent causal textures 
become less able to secure organizations’ viability in turbulent conditions. That is, as 
environmental conditions become more challenging and volatile for those in it from texture to 
texture, the new causal texture threatens the adaptive capacities (Kerstholt, 1994) organizations 
in the field had developed to do well in the prior causal texture. 
Interpreting the recent global financial crisis in CTT terms suggests this occurred time 
and again (see van der Heijden et al., 2008). That is, an American subprime mortgage meltdown 
became a national, then international, banking crisis. It then evolved into a global financial crisis 
in 2008. A variety of remarkable consequences have unfolded since then: A sovereign country 
debt crisis in EU member states in 2011; the Libor rate-fixing scandal in 2012; the current 
exchange and foreign exchange crises in emerging markets in 2013-14; and continued weakened 
economies and high unemployment. This unfolding set of crises can be read as the result of L22 
links for any single actor (bank, pension fund, regulatory agency) because contextual forces and 
factors were becoming linked in unexpected ways, beyond the purview or control of any of those 
                                                          
4
 McCann and Selsky (1984) and Baburoglu (1988) proposed hyper-turbulent and vortical environmental textures; 
these however are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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actors. For example, U.S. housing policy was linked with technical innovations in computerized 
trading and risk management; these were linked with regulatory agreements within and across 
countries and with risk-hedging mechanisms; and those were linked with the role of China in 
fueling economic growth and indebtedness in the West; etc. 
 
Turbulence in CTT. In a turbulent texture, L22 links overwhelm the other three link types (L11, 
L21 and L12) for any one actor. They become the most salient set of links that strategic planners 
and managers seeking the survival and prosperity of their organization in the turbulent texture 
must attend to.  
An organization’s experience of turbulence is the crucial determinant of its actual 
manifestation or of how it might be expected. If the perception is that the links managed by the 
organization (L11/21/12) are or might soon become insufficiently resilient due to changing 
broader environmental forces to maintain its position or its viability—that is, to cope with L22—
then turbulence is experienced. This means an environment perceived as turbulent by members 
of one organization may be perceived to be disturbed (Type III) or even placid (Type I or II) by 
members of other organizations in the same field (see McCann and Selsky, 1984). This 
interpretation differs from the original one offered by Emery and Trist (1965) who considered 
turbulence to be solely an objective property of a field, whereas here we consider it to be an 
individual assessment. As we discuss below, this assessment is mediated by perceived adaptive 
capacity (McCann and Selsky, 1984). 
Thus, CTT construes turbulence as unpredictable uncertainty for strategic planning 
purposes. The distinctive contribution of the social ecology school is to examine unpredictable 
uncertainty as 1) a contextual-level phenomenon, produced in a field of tightly coupled 
interactions which can produce unexpected bifurcations (Prigogine, 1996; Bernard, 2008) and 
field-level unintended consequences; and 2) as a distinguishing property of a distinct "texture" of 
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the environment. It is because of these characteristics that CTT opens the possibility of 
identifying high-level strategic stances which organizations would find helpful to pursue in each 
texture, as is illustrated in Table 2.  
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
Strategizing in a Turbulent Environment 
The argument we have made so far suggests that choosing a strategic approach and planning 
techniques and methods to engage effectively in turbulent conditions may involve an alternative 
to conventional neoclassically based strategic planning processes, as the latter are arguably better 
suited to the "pre"-turbulent causal textures.  
The direct implications for strategic planning in CTT have not been well developed. 
Selsky et al. (2007) began to redress this situation and we build on their work. They concluded 
that effective strategizing in a turbulent environment implied first and foremost seeking to 
decrease this turbulence, and required a shift in attention from any individual organization to the 
level of the field itself. This shift can best be accomplished via collaboration among functionally 
dissimilar kinds of organizations (Trist, 1983; Normann and Ramírez, 1993, 1994; Selsky and 
Parker, 2005). This, CTT holds, is intended to generate enough combined capacity to cope with 
the macro forces emanating from the L22, helping the field as a whole to become less turbulent 
while also making the strategic situation of each field member more tractable.  
Collaboration does not replace the "normal" industry competition in firms’ transactional 
environments that characterize the neoclassical approach. Instead, it complements competition 
with new, field-level kinds of strategic initiatives. Thus, responses to turbulence are often 
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complicated blends of competition and collaboration,
5
 which we explore below. 
To build upon Selsky et al.’s (2007) analysis we drill down into the mechanics of CTT in 
two steps: First, we derive three principles inherent in CTT. They help to understand the 
experience of turbulence. Second, we identify high-level strategic stances corresponding to each 
of these three principles. In the section following this one, we articulate the implications of this 
analysis for scenario planning. 
 
Three Underlying Principles in CTT 
The description of turbulence above suggests three interrelated principles which characterize 
CTT that have been implicit and which we here spell out explicitly for the first time. See Table 3. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
These principles carry insights that can help to rethink strategic planning in turbulent 
causal textures—and this can be enhanced with the help of scenarios. Moreover, as we show in 
the next subsection, clarifying these principles may help strategic planners to better appreciate 
the nature of the strategic situation they are facing, and thereby craft more effective strategies in 
turbulent environments. 
The transition principle suggests that turbulence is not a stable state of a field, but a state 
that manifests itself in strong moments and which can then dissipate - or accelerate further. Our 
reasoning is that turbulence or anticipated turbulence tends to generate coping behavior; if it is 
successful it will increase adaptive capacity, and in so doing reduce or eliminate turbulence at 
least for some organizations. If coping is unsuccessful, the turbulent field will remain controlled 
by L22 for a long time, eventually killing off members of the field who failed to devise effective 
                                                          
5
 A version of this suggested by Normann and Ramírez (1993) was that strategy would become interactive. 
Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996) referred to their version of how this works as "co-opetition". 
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adaptive capabilities in time. For example, Nokia and Blackberry have struggled to survive as 
independent entities in the new web-intensive environment in which Skype and WhatsApp and 
Google’s Android and Apple’s iPhone/iTunes alternatives have thrived. The field of mobile 
telephony was shifted by technology and other macro factors from one in which strategies 
seeking proficiency in devices and security with consumers and utilities gave way to strategies 
seeking success in software systems, apps, as well as customer data mining with developers, 
advertisers, and venture capitalists as well as consumers. The latter firms have shown better 
strategic planning and change capacities (up to now) than Nokia and Blackberry, although three 
of them have now been bought – Microsoft bought Nokia and Skype, and Facebook bought 
WhatsApp – and one split: Nokia first split off and then merged its network operations with 
those of Siemens.  
The heterogeneity principle suggests that turbulence is not necessarily homogenous 
across a whole field. Turbulence thus may be more salient in some parts of a field than in others 
(e.g. more for RIM and Nokia than for Apple). This makes a strategy of escaping the more 
turbulent parts and protecting or reinforcing the less-turbulent ones viable—see McCann and 
Selsky’s (1984) "social triage". However, without qualification this principle could be taken to 
mean that all organizations could leave the turbulent parts of a field (perhaps through mass 
migration, or abandonment of a market or niche), in effect eradicating turbulence. This 
contradicts the CTT premise that transactional linkages among organizations (L11, L12, L21) 
cannot control turbulence in an L22-dominated causal texture.  
Taking action to transform an organization from an individual "self" to an 
interorganizational collaborative "self" in the form of alliances or joint ventures amongst firms in 
different industries may be an effective strategy in such contexts (Ramírez and van der Heijden, 
2007). This collaboration creates enclaves of relative stability within the field. Firms from 
different industries may create such collaborative enclaves by designing "value constellations" 
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(Normann and Ramírez, 1993, 1994) and setting new standards, such as the VISA system in 
payment cards (involving banks, retailers, telecommunications companies, etc.), or the TetraPak 
UHT milk packaging system (involving farmers, logistics companies, retailers, dairies, etc.) 
(Ramírez and Wallin, 2000). Those within the enclave, or value constellation, profit from the 
standards that are created, as these reduce the salience of L22 and help to sustain L12, L21 
cooperation available only to those within the enclave. The L12, L21 standards (e.g., regarding 
what is legally possible to pay with VISA, and how healthy the "long-life" UHT milk will be) are 
internalized as a shared L11 by all members of the collaborative system, thereby strengthening 
its L12, L21, L11 linkage sets. In this way, the salience of L22 declines for those inside the 
collaborative enclave, while those outside the enclave continue to experience it as unpredictable 
and uncertain.  Continuing with the telephony example above, the GSMA organization 
(www.gsma.om) includes most major players in mobile telephony and organizes the 
collaborations in technical and other relevant standards that allow them to manage uncertainties 
together to be able to compete and to collaborate with each other. 
The subjectivity principle asserts that while turbulence may be an objective condition 
(“texture”) of a field, in practice it is experienced differently by particular organizations in the 
field, depending on their "perceived adaptive capacity" (McCann and Selsky, 1984) to cope. This 
is a crucial factor, because in a turbulent field the strategic situation of an organization—
constantly buffeted by potential or actual contextual disruptions, "black swan" events and other 
surprises—requires constant attention. The subjectivity principle implies that an organization can 
reduce turbulence by reimagining the L22 linkages creating the instability to find opportunities 
for action that it had not conceived before. For example, imagining different plausible futures for 
one’s uncertain context with the help of scenario planning, and then considering options for 
action and interactions with others, opens possibilities to envision, and on that basis to develop, 
the capabilities needed to successfully engage with turbulence (Ramírez et al., 2010). For 
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example, one of us worked with a Scottish whisky company facing unpredictable uncertainties in 
terms of how supermarkets’ changing business models (driven by Internet commerce, just-in-
time logistics, changing demographics, enhanced data analytics, and other contextual factors) 
might transform how they related with independent distilleries. Scenarios helped the company’s 
managers to imagine new possibilities to transform relations with these counterparts and enabled 
the company to thrive. 
As stated above, "salience" is manifested from someone’s perspective or experience. 
How that someone makes sense of the strategic situation is relative to their perceived adaptive 
capacity, and that capacity will determine if the salience of a contextual force is understood, 
misperceived or missed. Yet the subjectivity principle does not imply a sort of solipsism on the 
part of that someone working in an organization. Subjectivity is held in check by the coevolution 
between the actor and the context, by the interdependency with other perceivers in the 
organization and in the field, and by the objective basis of the turbulent causal texture. 
While the three principles are distinct, they can work together. For example, turbulence 
may rise during a certain period (transition principle), perhaps partly as a result of field actors’ 
weak collaborative actions (heterogeneity principle). And, these actors’ perceived adaptive 
capacities for action might be partly dependent upon how they imagine and experience the field 
and their place in it (subjectivity principle).  
 
Corresponding Strategic Stances for Turbulent Environments. The three principles implicit in 
CTT as articulated above indicate that turbulence is neither monolithic nor static, and suggest 
handles for engaging with it. The principles point to a set of corresponding strategic stances that 
an individual organization in a field currently in or threatened by a turbulent causal texture may 
undertake: a) stocking up resources to release or invest in time in order to survive and succeed 
over a turbulent period; b) relocating to a region of the field where the turbulence is felt less 
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acutely, and protecting or extending that region; and c) reinventing collaborative opportunity. 
These strategic stances aim to recreate more stable L21 and L12 conditions where strategic 
planners regain more control over their own activities.  
Below we outline each strategic stance in turn. Then, in the next section we demonstrate 
the value of scenarios in each of the three.  
Stocking up resources is the strategic stance that articulates the transition principle. It 
involves organizations building reserves of resources in times of no or low turbulence, enabling 
these organizations to invest those resources to strengthen themselves or to sit out or hide away 
when turbulence increases. This strategic stance depends on a good sense of anticipation, built-
up resilience and alertness, and capacity to change quickly. Anticipation comes from deep 
appreciation of developments in the contextual environment (perhaps aided by scenario 
planning), including a good sense of what is predictable and what is fundamentally uncertain. In 
terms of the strategic stances summarized in Table 3, organizations using this strategy attempt to 
reinforce their own region of the field.  
Stocking up with supplies before a harsh winter or storm is an apt image. A business 
example is the set of Basel III regulations and their proposed demand that banks hold more core 
capital to be able to sustain turbulent conditions without government bailouts and taxpayer 
subsidy. Seen as a counter-cyclical measure, this provision is consistent with the fluctuating 
nature of turbulence over time. Another example is a company amassing a "war chest" of cash, 
allowing it to buy other companies when the timing is right. A final example lies in military 
strategy: Armies are options for a scenario where war breaks out or can be used as a threat. A 
bigger and better-trained and equipped army lowers the likelihood of a war being declared by a 
country with a smaller and less-well-trained and equipped army.  
Protection or defense of stocked-up resources from possible attacks is another aspect of 
this strategic stance. Examples from history are physical boundaries, such as military or 
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geopolitical fortifications (the Great Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall, the Berlin Wall, the Israel-
Palestine and US-Mexico fences/walls), gated residential communities, and medieval 
monasteries. Business investments in IT firewalls to protect intellectual property serve a similar 
function. Border patrols, moats, defensive fortifications and software to prevent attacks secure 
bounded spaces intended to protect the certainty of the order "inside" from the disordered 
uncertainty perceived to lie on the other side of the boundary. In business contexts, trade barriers 
between countries, industry entry barriers and patent regimes are examples.  
In CTT terms, the focus of attention for the stocking up strategic stance is the L11 
linkages. This approach seeks to build up an organization’s existing and future adaptive capacity 
rather than reducing its experienced unpredictable uncertainty. If successful, the organization 
may become more capable of competing or collaborating with others by deploying and 
defending its built-up stocks (capabilities, resources, novel processes, etc.). 
The relocating strategic stance articulates the heterogeneity principle. It involves 
organizations migrating to locations in the field that are shielded from the worst impacts of 
turbulence. Historical examples include migrations away from oppression or resource-exhausted 
settings, such as the Irish migration to the New World during the 1840s famine, or the Jewish 
exodus from the European continent prior to World War II. A corporate example is "re-shoring"; 
that is, repatriating previously offshored factories to the better understood context of the home 
country (Gray et al., 2013).  
The CTT focus in the relocating strategic stance is the L21 (learning) linkages, because 
this is how organizations probe the environment, learning about more and less turbulent regions 
in the field and taking action (see Table 2). This may mean reworking monitoring and attention 
priorities, scanning and early warning systems to better imagine when and how uncertainty might 
increase or decrease. For example, Ramírez et al. (2013) assessed how Statoil and Nokia 
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deployed scenario planning to redirect the attention of their competitive intelligence 
professionals.  
The reinventing collaboration strategic stance articulates the subjectivity principle. It 
involves enriching organizations and their counterparts (Normann and Ramírez, 1993) with 
relevant knowledge about the possible unfolding of the turbulence they expect or are beginning 
to experience so they can negotiate and invent new roles and relationships. In this way they 
expect to reduce the turbulence they all face. Managers in a turbulent field may develop images 
of possible longer-term futures of their organizations and their environments (Emery, 1977). 
They may then deploy those images as an exploratory conceptual space, and consider longer-
term options such as new policies in the service of possible resource configurations that can be 
designed and developed in the nearer term together with other parties. The formation of the G20 
during the financial crisis is an excellent example of joint reinvention of policy, albeit more by 
similar than by dissimilar organizations. The same can be said for efforts to develop standards 
that serve organizations in different industries, such as the component standards established by a 
keystone firm in a business ecosystem across its global supply chain.  
The CTT focus in the reinventing collaboration stance is the L12 (planning) linkages. 
This stance bears directly on the cognitive dimension of strategic planning (Kaplan, 2011). 
Consistent with the principle of requisite variety (Ashby, 1956), reinvention seeks to enlist field 
members to plan together to redress the imbalance between L11 and L22 and jointly create and 
sustain more collective adaptive capacity in the field. 
 
Scenario Planning and CTT 
CTT suggests that in a turbulent environment the contextual environment L22 must be given 
much more attention in strategic planning than the transactional (L21, L12) environment, which 
neoclassically based strategic planning is largely concerned with. In turn, attending to the L22 
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argues for a much more important role for futures methods like scenario planning (Normann, 
2001). In this section, we explore some possible higher profile uses for scenario planning 
stimulated by the socio-ecological approach to strategy. 
Across the differences evident among the various schools of scenarios (Bradfield et al., 
2005; Ramírez and Selin, 2013), four themes that manifest the essence of scenario planning are 
discernible:  
• Scenario planning aims to distinguish between what people understand as 
predictable and what they perceive as unpredictably uncertain, where the latter 
means not only not predicted but not predictable (Knight, 1921). Scenario 
planning is concerned with the unpredictable uncertainties emanating from links 
among broad macro-level factors, not with routine predictable uncertainties, such 
as seasonal demand or supply fluctuations.  
 
• In scenario planning, that which is predictable is construed as an explicit model 
of the state of an organization and of its context. The model may be quantitative 
(e.g., a formal simulation) or qualitative (e.g., a narrative description, or a systems 
diagram). These models represent the relations both in the organization and in its 
context that are believed will continue unchanged into the future. Wack (1985a) 
called these “pre-determined elements”.  
 
• In scenario planning, the factors which the strategic planners consider 
unpredictable uncertainty entail alternative plausible boundary conditions of 
possible, relevant, and challenging future changes for the model of the 
organization and its context.  
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• In scenario planning, the links among parts of the organization and its context 
are driven by those alternative, plausible boundary conditions. The way these 
links might evolve is manifested as temporal unfoldings in the form of a small 
number of model simulations, often depicted in systems diagrams. These 
plausible future boundary conditions are presented as alternative stories about 
different future contexts and how they might unfold. These stories not only 
express the effect of the alternative possible future boundary (or environmental) 
conditions, but also maintain internal consistency with the predetermined 
elements of the organization-context relations. At least two such descriptive 
system diagrams and stories are made, since much of the value scenario planning 
enables in strategic planning rests in comparing a small set of possible albeit 
incompatible futures. The generation of multiple stories of the future distinguishes 
scenario planning from other futures techniques that produce single endpoints or 
images, such as trends, forecasts, visions or reference projections. 
 
Thus, scenarios help to surface and challenge existing assumptions about the environment 
of an organization and about how organization and environment might plausibly coevolve. They 
help decision-makers to understand not only the contexts in which they might find themselves in 
the future, but also those which they are operating in now, helping them to better prepare 
strategic options for action and to ascertain possible consequences (Normann, 2001). Scenarios 
use the future and its plausibilities to better understand the organization’s context in the present. 
Scenarios do so by stimulating a more authentic dialogue to obtain a “higher quality strategic 
conversation” (van der Heijden, 2005; Wilkinson et al., 2013) about the unpredictable 
uncertainty in the field as it is manifested for any organization in such a field as its environment.  
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These four themes transcend the difference between the two approaches to strategy we 
have contrasted. Strategic planners may make use of scenario planning, but in different ways (for 
different purposes?). An exemplar of how neoclassically based strategic planners have made use 
of scenarios can be found in Michael Porter’s Competitive Advantage (1995). There Porter 
dismisses "macroscenarios"—that is, future images of “macroeconomic and macropolitical 
factors”—as “too general to be sufficient for developing strategy in a particular industry” (Porter, 
1995, 446-447), albeit useful for formulating strategy creatively in conditions of uncertainty. He 
suggests instead that “the appropriate unit for analysis of scenarios is the industry,” and that 
industry scenarios “allow a firm to translate uncertainty into its strategic implications” for 
competitive strategy (Porter, 1995, 447).  
From a socio-ecological perspective the unit of “industry” represents just one, indeed a 
narrow, set of possible links in the transactional environment. While clearly important for 
strategic planning purposes, in a turbulent environment the industry becomes too limiting as a 
main focus. For instance, it is not so relevant when devising strategies for activities that need to 
cross industry boundaries, such as for nutraceuticals, mobile payments, (Arvidsson, 2014) city 
services or other cross-industry domains. Thus, socio-ecologically based planners understand the 
"broad macro-level forces" (see first bullet above) as aspects of the shared field experienced by 
all organizations in it as their respective contextual environments. Porter’s macroscenarios would 
correspond in socio-ecological terms to the salience given to the L22, and industry scenarios 
would be an aspect of the transactional (L12, L21) linkage sets. In socio-ecologically based 
strategic planning the attention is on how "macroscenarios" might plausibly transform the 
industry scenarios the neoclassical school focuses on. The attention is also on a broader view of 
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markets and other aspects of an organization’s environment, which increasingly includes non-
economic stakeholders
6
 and cannot be confined to a single "industry". 
With a socio-ecological approach to strategic planning, scenario planning not only 
complements competitive strategy in turbulent conditions by framing strategic choices in 
multiple future plausible imagined contexts, but also can change strategies in some settings—see 
Wilkinson and Kupers (2013) for the case of Shell. Scenario planning from a socio-ecological 
perspective helps managers in organizations to engage turbulence in ways that scenario planning 
from a neoclassical perspective does not—and perhaps cannot. More specifically, as turbulence 
threatens to bring forth more unpredictable uncertainty than that which an organization or an 
industry has had to address and can cope with in non-turbulent conditions, its strategists may 
want to appreciate what it might be like to conduct business in different versions of the future. 
Scenario planning helps them to do so.  
As scenarios examine the context within which strategic planning takes place, they 
cannot be confounded with strategy itself. Instead, they are deployed in the role of the test bed 
within which strategic options are considered. Scenario planning practitioners use the metaphor 
of a wind tunnel, where the strategy or intended business model is like a model airplane and the 
scenarios are the wind tunnel simulating the contextual flying conditions the actual plane may 
one day have to fly in. Because scenario planning helps to frame the strategic agenda by 
providing planners with a small set of distinct possible frames (Wilkinson and Ramírez, 2010), 
we believe Wright et al.’s (2013) suggestion that scenario analysis is a "discrete stage" in 
strategic planning is misguided. Scenario planning does not always precede strategic planning. 
Sometimes strategy is there first and needs checking via wind tunneling with the help of a set of 
scenarios. And, sometimes scenarios are conducted before a new strategy is determined.  
                                                          
6
 In Porter’s recent work he has broadened his sights to "sharing" value with other, non-economic stakeholders in the 
firms’ context (see Porter and Kramer, 2011).  
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Nonetheless, scenario planning can take on a higher profile role in strategic planning in 
turbulent environments. For example, scenarios can help strategic planners to reconsider their 
transactional linkage configurations by "upframing" their strategic analysis. According to 
Normann (2001), upframing involves moving the strategic analysis to a higher level of 
conceptualization. Upframing puts the mind of the strategist in a future conceptual context. This 
resituating frees the mind (Ramírez et al., 2013) from the constraints inherited from the past, 
when it considers options in broader contextual terms in the present. We offer illustrations of a 
higher profile role for scenario planning in strategic planning below. 
 
How Scenarios Contribute to Strategic Planning in Turbulent Environments 
Strategic planners may make use of scenarios in turbulent environments in several different 
ways. These include: 
 
(a) recognizing that the causal texture of a field might become turbulent before it actually 
does so, and imagining the possibilities and challenges this might pose for one’s strategy 
(http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2010/ekits/Evolving_Internet_GBN_Cisco_2010_Aug_r
ev2.pdf).  
 
(b) assessing whether the context is beginning to become or has already become turbulent 
if (a) has not been possible, and imagining different possibilities and challenges this 
might pose for one’s strategy (Arvidsson, 2014).  
 
(c) given (a) and/or (b), helping to prepare for turbulence by identifying experiments, 
prototypes, research, and actions to arrest the development of turbulence by engaging in 
active-adaptive behaviour and avoiding maladaptive behaviour (Ramírez et al., 2011). 
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(d) giving guidance and hope to those already in a turbulent environment by proposing 
collaborative strategic options and/or designing in authentic collaborative activities that 
stabilize and/or develop the field (Emery and Trist, 1965; Trist, 1979).  
 
Based on the connections we have drawn between turbulence and scenarios, we now 
tease out aspects of scenario planning informed by the three strategic stances discussed in the 
previous section (see Table 3).  
Scenario planning can help strategic planners with their stocking up strategies to imagine 
how a field in a Type III causal texture might become turbulent, and the possible ways in which 
turbulence might play out if and when the texture of the field advances to Type IV (see Table 1).  
An example is the classic scenarios produced by Shell in the early 1970s about the 
possible creation of OPEC (Wack, 1985). This reportedly led the company to build up a portfolio 
of assets suited for this possibility which the competition did not, giving them substantial 
competitive advantage for many years.  
Scenario planning with stocking up strategies considers how what existed in a non-
turbulent context might help survival in a turbulent one, and how to plan to best enhance the 
organization’s prospects. Thus an army may be "underused" during peaceful periods of non-
turbulence and "stretched" in periods of turbulence, even if no war actually breaks out. A 
military policy scenario exercise as part of a larger geopolitical or counterterrorism policy review 
may thus generate the awareness that more "spare capacity" should be built ex ante, such as by 
training and arming reservists that can be called upon if needed. 
With relocation strategies scenario planning can enable those in a field to explore 
together what a shared future might hold, then imagine which parts of the field they can access 
might have less turbulence, and how they might move, create or strengthen enclaves.  
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An example the first author was involved in was efforts by London First, an association 
of London-based businesses, to prevent businesses already located in London from relocating 
elsewhere and to encourage further business migration into London. In a similar way, van der 
Heijden (personal communication) advised the Limburg region of Holland, where economic 
activity and creative professionals have been leaving, on how that tide of brain drain and 
economic decline can be stemmed, and to help the community to explore what futures they might 
need to plan for. 
Scenario planning here involves imagining which alternative contexts might better house 
the existing business logic of the strategizing organization and as part of strategic planning 
preparing contingency plans for repositioning assets to those contexts should the need arise. 
Shipping companies such as Maersk do this well. Similarly, as discussed above, some local 
economic development initiatives attempt to forge common ground among business and labor 
interests to attract investment and jobs back into the community. 
With reinvent-collaboration strategies scenario planning helps strategic planners to 
reframe unpredictable uncertainty not only as threatening but also as a source of opportunities 
(Ramírez and van der Heijden, 2007; Sull, 2009). Joint scenario planning invites those in the 
field to consider what competencies and skills they can jointly muster to enhance their adaptive 
capacities.  
As scenario work facilitates higher quality, more authentic strategic conversations about 
possible future contexts, scenarios help those in the conversations to explore and appreciate each 
other’s perspectives (van der Heijden, 2005). This in turn can help them to broaden their 
strategic thinking, learn about possibilities they were unaware of, and explore ways of putting 
them into practice through joint experiments, ventures and projects.  
Van der Heijden’s project on the future of Indian agriculture (2008, 2010) is a good 
example of this use of scenarios. An initial set of scenarios developed in that project helped the 
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World Bank, Indian agricultural researchers, and stakeholders to examine what options would 
and would not be possible to consider for the Indian agricultural sector going forward. Once the 
first set of conversations ran their course, the first set of scenarios was laid aside, and a second 
generation of scenarios was constructed to further clarify the options and improve the quality of 
the subsequent strategic conversations. 
Another example is the World Economic Forum’s 2009 project to explore the future of 
pensions (Sikken et al., 2008), which first developed a set of scenarios that considered a set of 
different plausible conditions pensioners and pension fund managers might live in. The project 
then developed strategic options for joint action, which enabled disparate actors (e.g., private 
firms, nation states, and interest groups) to jointly assess how they might tackle their pensions 
challenges in an ageing society. A second round of work following the scenarios was undertaken 
to identify opportunities for common action (Hayashi et al., 2009), which produced a report that 
kept the conversation going, and spawned various joint initiatives among players from different 
industries. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have argued that strategic planning today is still largely dominated by mental 
models based in neoclassical economics, characterized by the individual organization as the unit 
of analysis and action, intra-industry competition, and fields in relatively stable equilibrium. 
However, the relentless advance and spread of turbulence in the contextual environments of 
many organizations—signified most forcefully by the 11th of September 2001 attacks and the 
events these spawned, and more recently the Great Financial Crisis—have called those models 
into question. Contextual turbulence can no longer be safely ignored nor considered to be an 
aberration on an otherwise relatively stable field. Therefore, new strategic planning modes are 
needed. 
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To this end, we contrasted what we called the "conventional neoclassically based 
approach" to strategic planning with a "socio-ecological" approach by centering attention on how 
each handles contextual unpredictable uncertainty. We proposed that the socio-ecological 
approach, and specifically the causal textures theory of organizational environments, is better 
suited to appreciating and engaging the unpredictable uncertainty that characterizes turbulent 
environments than neoclassically based strategy. Our analysis leads us to conclude that in 
turbulent environments strategic planners would be well advised to extend their repertoire of 
tools to also include methods that help engage unpredictable contextual uncertainty like scenario 
planning. Thus, we argued that causal textures theory helps strategic planners to better 
understand the broader, higher order purpose of scenario planning, and guides them on how to 
make use of scenario planning to effect better strategies in a turbulent environment.  
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it advances understanding of turbulent 
causal textures in ways that strategic planners and strategic planning researchers can harness. We 
began by contrasting two senses of uncertainty, and arguing that conventional strategic planning 
attends largely to the "predictable" kind, which can be calculated with probability and managed 
or hedged as risk. However, we also argued that not attending to the other kind, "unpredictable" 
uncertainty, is itself “risky”—or, rather, "dangerous"—in today’s volatile and highly disruptive 
conditions. Because the strategic situation is so uncertain, multiple alternative images of possible 
futures are needed in strategic planning under such conditions (Ramírez and Selin, 2014). Our 
analysis suggested that a central purpose of scenario work is to support strategic planners facing 
turbulent causal textures or wanting to prepare themselves (and others in their transactional 
environment) for such eventualities.  
It is thus that CTT shows that scenario methods are particularly suited to engaging the 
contextual environment (L22) when unpredictable uncertainty becomes especially salient for 
strategic planning. This makes it distinct from scenario planning in the neoclassical mode, which 
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dismisses the contextual environment and confounds the transactional environment with only 
one narrow – and typically historical- possibility; namely, the industry. 
In situations where the contextual uncertainty described by complex and tightly coupled 
L22 relationships is not salient for strategy, then methods derived from and consistent with 
neoclassical economics which address the transactional L12, L21 linkages directly—such as 
competitive positioning, forecasting, or "war-gaming"—are likely to be more useful. In this 
regard, strategic planners might use the features in Table 1 as a heuristic guide or checklist in 
assessing their contextual environment. Thus, we provide a conceptually robust basis for why 
and how scenario planning can help strategic planners to address the neglected aspect of 
uncertainty advantageously in their strategic planning.  
Second, our analysis extends causal textures theory and gives it a broader set of 
actionable handles in the field of strategic planning. CTT’s seminal contribution to 
understanding organizational environments was to identify the distinctive features of turbulence 
in the contextual environments shared by all organizations in a particular field, and to explore 
responses to it. In the most common usage, "turbulence" is simply a lot of change, or sudden and 
unexpected change that challenges the decision and strategic planning capabilities of managers. 
However, CTT specifies that the passage into turbulence is a distinctive casual texture that 
involves a felt loss (or feared future loss) of adaptive capacity by those in it. Ramirez and van der 
Heijden (2007) extended this further to include not only loss of adaptive capacity but the 
potential loss of not developing new options to do well in the future – our approach here, 
consistent with theirs, makes the CTT strategic stance less ‘passive-reactive’ and more 
interactive-creative. 
We posited that, rather than being monolithic, turbulence has three kinds of variability: 
temporal, spatial and cognitive. We articulated these in terms of three principles: transition, 
heterogeneity and subjectivity. It is this specification of turbulence that allowed us to suggest 
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how scenario planning deployed in the socio-ecological mode can help strategic planners in 
turbulent environments to address the challenges turbulence poses – and to do well in such 
conditions. These principles help to clarify options available to strategic planners to better 
engage the unpredictable uncertainty of turbulence. They provide planners with a conceptual 
framework to assess when to deploy scenarios that attend to macro- or contextual environment 
changes for strategic planning purposes, as summarized in Tables 2 and 3. For researchers, this 
analysis invites further conceptual developments of CTT in relation to contextual disruptions, 
transitions, system dynamics models of large-scale fields, the resilience of such fields, foresight 
processes and coevolution.  
We hope our analysis will usefully inform reflective strategic planning practitioners 
engaged in scenario work, and deliver new insights for scholars seeking to understand better how 
exogenous unpredictable uncertainty informs choices about when scenarios might be used as an 
effective strategic intervention method.  
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